Employability of Young Italian Males after a Jobless Period, 1989-1998 by Bruno Contini & Ambra Poggi
  1 
 
Employability of young Italian males  
after a jobless period, 1989-1998 
   
  Bruno Contini 
University of Turin and 
LABORatorio R. Revelli, Collegio Carlo Alberto 
 
 
  Ambra Poggi 
 
University of Milan Bicocca and 
LABORatorio R. Revelli, Collegio Carlo Alberto 
 
Abstract 
In  this  paper  we  investigate  the  existence  of  negative  jobless  duration  dependence  and  the 
impact of jobless spells on future wages. Our findings are relatively out of line compared to 
analogous explorations.   We find evidence of very long unemployment duration of the young 
male  labor  force, much higher than reported anywhere else in Western Europe.  Despite our 
findings on unemployment duration, negative unemployment duration dependence is modest.  
While the probability of re-employment decreases also in Italy  as elapsed joblessness becomes 
longer, such decay is small.  Finally, we show that young Italian males experiencing jobless 
periods in their  early careers face small re-employment wage losses. Such losses do increase 
with the duration of joblessness, but here, once again, they are lower than reported in Unites 
States, Canada, UK, France and Spain.   
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The aim of this paper is to answer to the following question: ”do youth jobless spells 
impact on employability and future wages in Italy?”.  
The problem of European unemployment has spurred an immense amount of academic 
literature. In the 1970s the European unemployment rate started to rise sharply.  From the mid-
1980s until 1990,  it gradually fell  although it remained still  higher than the early 1970s. Large 
differences in unemployment trends were observed across European countries. The European 
unemployment problem is magnified when focussed on youth workers:  youth unemployment 
ranges from 18-23% in France, Italy and Spain in the late 1990s (Howell et all., 2006). The 
incidence  of  youth  unemployment  has  been  related  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  educational 
system at easing the transition on from school to work (see, for instance, OECD, 2000), to 
labour  market institutions (such  as  unemployment benefits for the young,  minimum  wages, 
labour cost and flexibility, etc.), to the role of the family at providing income support (Bentolina 
and Ichino, 2000), and to the evolution of the relative size of the youth population (Korenman 
and Neumark, 2000). 
Youth unemployment raises special concern in regard to its detrimental effects on long 
term  welfare.  A number of empirical studies of both U.S.  and European countries suggest that 
the employability of jobless persons deteriorates as their joblessness persists. Blanchard and 
Summers (1989), Layard and Nickell (1987), Machin and Manning (1999), all emphasize the 
adverse effect of long term unemployment on human capital, skill obsolescence and stigma.  
The  negative  relationship  between  the  duration  of  joblessness  and  the  probability  of  being 
rehired persists also when selection issues related to workers’ heterogeneity are included in the 
analysis (Van den Berg and Van Ours, 1994 and 1996). Torelli and Trivellato (1989) study 
youth unemployment duration in Italy, confirming state dependence.  Ordine (1992) also reports 
evidence  of  state  and  duration  dependence  for  prime  age  Italian  unemployed  and  first-job   3 
seekers.  Recently, Addison, Centeno and Portugal (2004)  offer new evidence that the hazard 
function exhibits strong negative dependence in the EU15.   
Workers experience wage cuts after long unemployment spells.  These  could be related 
to reservation wages guided by low unemployment benefits or due to the depreciation of general 
and specific human capital skills during unemployment.  Farber and Gibbins (1996) focus on 
the signaling problem associated with job loss: displacement may be particularly costly if it is 
used by prospective and future employers as a signal of bad worker performance.  Previous 
literature on the United State (Ruhm, 1991; Addison and Portugal, 1989; Topel, 1990; Jacobson 
et al, 1993; Farber, 1993 and 1997; Seninger, 1997) and Canada (Houle and Van Audenrode, 
1995)  indicate that joblessness  leads to wage losses of an order of magnitude of 10% to 15%.  
Kletzer and Fairlie (2003) find that the earnings loss of young workers after re-employment are 
also substantial, although smaller and less persistent than those observed for older and more 
established workers.  Wage losses  in EU could be distorted by wage rigidities, but evidence is 
still insufficiently conclusive and new studies are necessary. Among the existing contributions
1, 
Gregory and Jukes (1997), Cohen, Lefranc and Saint-Paul (1997) and Rosolia and Saint-Paul 
(1998) analyse the impact of joblessness on re-employment wages using respectively British, 
French and Spanish data:  the wage loss of displaced workers in France and UK is similar to the 
one observed in US,  while it is higher in Spain.   On the other hand,   Addison, Centeno, and 
Portugal (2008)  report that there is scant evidence of a decline in reservation wages with longer 
joblessness in the EU15.  Contini and Villosio (2006) deliver, instead,  results in line with the 
weak  evidence  of  unemployment  duration  on  re-employment  wages  found  here:  using 
microdata from the same source as this paper, they suggest that  prolonged unemployment spells 
in Italy have a modest negative impact on the wage growth of white-collar employees (up to 2.5 
p.p. for a six-month spell), very slight on the blue-collars’.   
Our focus is on the Italian labour market. The period of analysis is the late 1980s and 
the  early  1990s.    As  explained  before,  the  labour  market  was  characterized  by  high  and 
persistent youth unemployment, while the traditionally rigid labour market institutions were 
                                                            
1  Other  interesting  studies  are  Lefranc  (2003)  Ahn  and  Garcia-Perez  (2002)  and  Garcia-Perez  and 
Rebollo-Sanz (2006)   4 
undergoing change. A reform aimed at introducing flexibility was enacted in 1997 (Pacchetto 
Treu); its main  innovation  is  the  “contratto di collaborazione  continuativo” (“co.co.co”),   a 
mixed form of dependent work and self-employment, that delivered considerable flexibility and 
cost savings to the employers, and much less security to the employees.   
Moreover the  1989-1998  period is a particularly interesting time window as it contains 
an entire business cycle, from the boom of the late 1980s to the deep recession of the early 
1990s.  We analyze jobless duration and post joblessness wage loss in Italy  from October 1989 
to  December  1995,  focusing  on  youth  males  who  have  had  a  relatively  significant  work 
experience and job attachment.  
 Two issues are faced in this exploration.  First, we investigate the existence of negative 
jobless  duration  dependence.      This  provides  the  basis  for  a  better  understanding  of  the 
mechanisms  that  produce  employer  stigmatization,  discouragement,  and  human  capital 
depreciation over the course of joblessness.   Second, we investigate the impact of  jobless 
duration on wages, addressing the issues of self selection into employment and the endogeneity 
of jobless duration.   The analysis provides preliminary signals of the jobless effects on the 
welfare of the young people in the longer term.  Empirical analysis is based on WHIP (Work 
Histories Italian Panel), a unique employer-employee linked panel database which represents a 
very detailed source of information on the working histories of Italian employees.  
According to a  recent paper by Tatsiramos (2009),  the average Italian unemployment 
duration for no-benefit recipients in the Nineties was about 12 months:  55.3 per cent of non-
recipients in Italy were reported unemployed after 6 months, and 35.2% were still unemployed 
after 12 months.  His estimates are based on EU-SILC  data.   
In this paper we provide  new and more dramatic evidence on very long unemployment 
duration of Italy’s  young male  labor  force:  in the course of the Nineties  40%  of  the 
unemployed  had yet to find a job 36 months after entry in the jobless state.  This share was 
down to 33% for those aged 16-19 on their first job, and reached 51%  for the late starters (over 
26).  These numbers imply much longer unemployment duration than reported anywhere else in 
Western  Europe.      In  addition,  our  results  confirm  the  existence  of    negative  duration   5 
dependence of young Italian males,  although to a much weaker extent  than all the above 
mentioned contributions.  
The paper’s contribution to the existing literature is threefold.  Firstly, as already 
mentioned, we  provide  new and more dramatic evidence on very long unemployment 
duration  of Italy’s male   labor   force, much longer than reported  anywhere else in 
Western  Europe.  Secondly, our results confirm the existence of   negative  duration 
dependence  of  young  Italian  males,  but  to  a  weaker  extent    than  other  known 
contributions.   Thirdly,  we  offer new econometric  evidence on the adverse effects of a 
period of joblessness on young Italian workers’ wages upon re-employment.   Also on this 
score, our results indicate that  youth  experiencing jobless periods in their  early careers face 
significant, but  small re-employment wage losses. Such losses do increase with the duration of 
joblessness,  but,  in  line  with  other  reported  differences,  they  are  much  lower  than  those 
observed in Unites States, Canada, UK, France and Spain. 
These findings are novel and relevant for the design of employment policy and for a 
better  understanding  of    the  effects  of  the  European  unemployment  problem  on  the  future 
welfare of  young workers.  Low unemployment duration dependence and modest  job losses at 
re-employment may be good news, but they are  overshadowed by the bad news on the length of 
unemployment.    Here  is  where  the  real  problem  lies:    perhaps  not  a  great  discovery,  but 
certainly  important  to  re-address  policy  instruments  aimed  at  easing  the  tensions  that  run 
through the Italian labor market.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides detailed information on the data. In 
section 3, we illustrate the model used in subsequent paragraphs. In section 4, we present the 




2. Definitions and data   6 
We use the Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP), an employer-employee linked panel database 
developed  by  Italian  Social  Security  administrative  sources.    The  WHIP  data
2  are  a 
representative  sample  of  the  population  of  employees  of  the  private  sector  (agriculture 
excluded), apprentices, self-employed, atypical (non-standard) contracts, as well as all public 
employees working without tenure (nowadays almost 50% of the young public employees) 
3. 
The sample - population ratio is 1:90. WHIP observations start in 1986 and, as of today, end in 
2003.  For reasons explained below we limit analysis to the 1988-1998 decade.  The Italian 
Social Security Administration (INPS) collects data both on individual employees and firms for 
institutional purposes.   The reference population is made up of the all individuals – Italian and 
foreign  –  who  have  been  regularly  employed  or  self-employed.    Firms  pay  social  security 
contributions to INPS for all workers on payroll. Data are recorded on a monthly basis, and 
therefore  working  spells  can  be  precisely  reconstructed.    The  WHIP  database  contains 
information  on  worker  age,  professional  category,  industrial  sector,    length  of  employment 
spells,  geographical  location,    working  contract  and    monthly  wages
4.      In  administrative 
archives,  information  not  related  to  the  specific  interest  of  the  Italian  Social  Security 
Administration  (i.e.  marriage  status,  children,  etc.)  is  not  present.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
coverage  and  accuracy  of  administrative  archives  cannot  be  matched  in  any  other  dataset. 
Neither  out-of-the-labor-force  people,  nor  the  unemployed  who  are  not  eligible  for 
unemployment benefits appear in the INPS files. 
We  use  data  from  January  1985  to  December  1998.    While  more  recent  data  are 
available, we focus on this period as it covers an observation period centered around years 
immediately  preceding  and  following  the  1993-94  recession.    The  Treu  Reform  of  1997 
introduced new atypical contracts (“co.co.co”,  a mix of dependent work and self-employment 
which allowed great flexibility): while the “co.co.co” working spells are reported in the WHIP 
                                                            
2 The WHIP is public use database.  See http://www.laboratoriorevelli.it/. 
  
3  Social  security  contributions  of  the  public  sector  are  paid  to  a  different  institution  (INPDAP).  In 
principle  INPDAP  ought  to  have  the  same  data  as  Italian  Social  Security  Administration,  but, 
unfortunately,  the  INPDAP  data  warehouse  has  never  been  completed  and  precise  data  on  public 
employment are non-existent.  The (unofficial) Italian count is based on Labour Force Survey data.        
4 Monthly wage is computed using information about yearly wage and the number of days worked during 
the year.  The yearly wage is divided by the number of days and multiplied by 26 days.  Real monthly 
wage is computed in the standard way.   7 
database,    earnings  data  are  not  available.  As  a  consequence  we  exclude  them  from 
investigation  as  they  would  considerably  fuzzy  the  picture  that  we  obtain.  The  loss  of 
information, however,  is small as the utilization of the new contract became important only 
toward the end of 1998.    
Exits  from  the  databases  reflect  transitions  from  employment  to  non-employment  or 
unemployment.  In principle, we do not have any attrition problems because, once a certain 
group of individuals is selected, it is possible to follow them over the entire working life.  There 
are, however, few exceptions:(i) movements from private to public activities go unrecorded if 
the job switch is accompanied by full tenure in the public sector (a very rare event for young 
people in the last twenty years) 
5;  (ii) shifts  from employment to school go also unrecorded.   If 
they are temporary, they  will be followed  by re-entry in the labor market some time thereafter, 
in which case no information is lost.  The case of no re-entry is the exception. Exceptions (i) 
and (ii) involve a small number of individuals.  Instead exception (iii) -  moves from regular 
employment into the parallel, hidden economy –  are presumably frequent especially among 
individuals with certain characteristics – possibly, low educational attainment – but they are 
undetectable by definition. 
As in other  studies on the employability of young displaced workers (Topel and Ward, 1992; 
Kletzer and Fairlie, 2003)  we restrict attention to individuals at the very beginning of their career, 
exhibiting a relatively high attachment to the labor market.  In order to meet these requirements, 
our sample includes young male employees (aged 16-30) with the following characteristics: 
-  absent from the WHIP database  in the 1985-88 time window: this insures that the job 
observed starting in 1989 is one’s first working experience; 
-  first working experience between January 1989 and December 1993; 
-  employed for a period of 9 up to 23 months;  
                                                            
5  This exclusion includes also to the  military and police services. On the other hand individuals in 
draft age, employed by the same firm before and after the ten-month period corresponding to 
mandatory military service are considered as regularly employed throughout. Usually individuals 
complete military service before entering the labour market.  Military service was mandatory until 1992, 
and then become voluntary.   The Ministry of  Defense estimates about 20 thousand /year new entries, 
about  0.5% of the Italian male population 20-29 and less than 3% of the total number of young entries in 
the labor market.  
   8 
-  started a jobless period between October 1989 and December 1995.   
The reason for excluding individuals with working spells longer than 23 months is 
twofold:   (i) we wish to observe  working histories for 36 months after involuntary 
separation; (ii) only doing so can we exclude all recipients of unemployment benefits: 
we would, otherwise,  risk to observe some and leaving out others, with no possibility to 
control. 
6  
The idea of restricting attention to the “relatively attached” workers (those with 
initial employment spells at least equal to 9 months) allows to make our results comparable with 
other studies 
7   Such a selection may introduce an “optimistic” bias in our results.  On the other 
hand, the exclusion of those who had a working spell longer than 23 months may also introduce 
selection in the opposite direction, as many of these could be “very good” workers.   
In  addition,  analysis  ought  to  be  restricted  to  individuals  who  have  experienced 
involuntary separations.  In order to single out involuntary separations, we exclude all the job-
to-job movements and the job switches that take place within the same month.  Thus, in first 
instance, we consider as involuntary all separations that last at least one month.
8  But we also 
test  our  results  using  a  stricter  definition  of  involuntary  separation  (lasting  at  least  three 
months),  obtaining only minor changes in the results (see par. 5).  
                                                            
6   Complete information on  “unemployment beneficiaries” is not available in WHIP.  Unemployment 
benefits  were seldom granted in the Nineties, with the exception of the construction sector.  Workers 
were instead eligible for tor temporary layoff benefits  (C.I.G.S.  Cassa Integazione Guadagni 
Straordinaria), when unemployment exceeded 24months.   CIGS payments are, instead,  recorded in 
WHIP,  involving about  3% of the sample individuals.      
 
7  In order to define labor market attachment, other authors have used tenures slightly longer than 9 
months (e.g., by Topel and Ward, 1992; Kletzer and Fairlie, 2003). In our view, nine months is a 
reasonable long period to signal a sufficient degree of attachment (while, the risk of capturing short-term 
employment before a return to formal schooling or training is negligible). 
 
8 The difference between quits  (voluntary separations) and layoffs (involuntary separations) is always 
very problematic in applied economics. Layoffs carry a stigma that may often lead interviewed people not 
to report them in surveys, or to instead report a quit.  Administrative data may be more reliable if the 
payment of unemployment benefits is individually reported (as already explained, in our sample few 
workers are eligible for such provisions). In LFS-type surveys employers may be unwilling to report 
correctly: for example, in the early 2000 Fiat dismissed over 20 thousand workers, 25% declared layoffs 
and  75%  quits.  But  all  the  reported  quits  were  “forced  resignations”  accompanied  by  a  generous 
severance payment made conditional to the acceptance of dismissal (reported by national press)..         9 
Our  final  sample  includes  2318  workers  whose  working  history  is  followed  for  36 
months.
9  The average elapsed period of joblessness is about 20 months (and about 10 months 
for the sub-sample of individuals re-employed by the end of the period of study). For more 
details on sample composition see Table 1. 
 
3. The Model 
3. 1   Transition out of joblessness 
We  analyze  the  duration  of  joblessness  with  a  view  of  investigating  the 
existence of negative duration dependence and of understanding which factors influence 
the transition path.  Negative duration dependence may be produced by declining job 
offer arrival rates, increasing reservation wages, or/and from an adversely shifting wage 
offer  distribution  (Addison  et  al.  2004).      An  alternative,  while  not  exclusive, 
explanation  suggests that negative dependence may be a consequence of sorting of the 
more employable among the jobless workers.    We use a discrete-time hazard rate 
model (i.e. Narendranathan and Nickell, 1989; Jenkins and Garcia-Serrano, 2000).  In 
particular, we consider all individuals from the moment they become jobless and are 
likely to exit thereafter. The probability of person i of being re-employed after t months, 
given that he has been jobless for t-1, is assumed here to be a standard logit hazard 
function: 
       
(1)    h it = exp[xit’b b b b+g(t)]/(1+exp[xit’b b b b+g(t)]) 
where  xit  is  the  vector  of  (time-constant  and  time-varying)  covariates,  b b b b    is  a  vector  of 
parameters to be estimated and g(t) is some functional form of how the duration of the spell 
affects  the  hazard  rate  (baseline  function).  For  the  latter,  we  initially  use  a  linear  log-time 
                                                            
 
9 Of the initial sample of 3199 individuals, about 7% are re-employed with atypical contracts and 16% 
become  self-employed.  Therefore,  our  sample  is  representative  of  the  population  of  young  males 
experiencing  jobless  periods  and  currently  looking  for  jobs.    We  disregard,  for  the  time  being,  the 
potential impact of multiple spells. 
   10 
specification. In second instance, we use a flexible specification (duration-interval dummies) in 
order to avoid the potential estimation bias due to the specific assumption of the form of the 
baseline  function  (Meyer,  1990).  Estimation  of  the  model  parameters  can  be  done  using 
standard software applied to a re-organized data set in which, for each person, there are as many 
data rows as there are time intervals at risk of the event (Allison, 1982; Jenkins, 1995; Jenkins 
and  Garcia-Serrano,  2000).  Since  individuals  might  differ  in  unobserved  terms  like  ability, 
effort, and taste and these differences could remain constant over time, we include unobserved 
heterogeneity in the specification of the hazard rate. 
 
3.2  Post-joblessness wage analysis 
The impact of joblessness on earnings of individuals who re-enter the job market is estimated on 
the following specification: 
 
  (2)  log(wa) = za g g g ga + aa log(t) + ba log(wp) + ua 
 
where log(wa) is the logarithm of the post-joblessness real monthly wage, za is the vector of the 
explanatory  variables  that  influence  the  post-joblessness  wages  but  not  the  pre-joblessness 
earnings (i.e. attributes of the new job, changes of industry, working area and occupation, and 
actual local unemployment rates), log(t) is the logarithm of the elapsed joblessness duration (in 
months) and log(wp) is the logarithm of previous job earnings. The estimation of the above 
equation raises two main econometric issues: selection and endogeneity. 
Selection  problems  arise  as  a  considerable  fraction  of  the  jobless  individuals  were  not  re-
employed as of December 1998. For such individuals the effects of the determinants of post-
joblessness earnings could be systematically different from those of re-employed people. The 
conventional  two-step  selectivity  adjustment  procedure  proposed  by  Heckman  (1979)  is 
implemented, leading to consistent parameter estimates. We also use the suggestion of  Hill,   11 
Adkins, Bender (2003)  to calculate correct standard errors in presence of heteroskedasticity
10. 
Heckman-type  selection  models  normally  need  at  least  one  “extra”  explanatory  factor  that 
influences selection but not the subsequent outcome of interest. Often such “extra” exogenous 
variable is not available.  This is our case: the same elements affecting selection will also affect 
the length of the unemployment spells (although some may not affect post-jobless wages). The 
Heckman selection models are also estimable without the extra variable, with results resting 
only upon the distributional assumptions of the residuals rather than upon the variation in the 
explanatory variable (Sartori 2003; Liao 1995).  Despite the concerns expressed by Dufour and 
Hsiao (2006) on violations of the distributional assumptions, model identification based solely 




The endogeneity problem is created by the potentially simultaneous determination of acceptance 
wages and jobless spell length.  The complete model can be written as 
     log(wa) = za g g g ga + aa log t + ba log(wp)+ ua         (3) 
log(t) = z g g g gd + bd log(wp)+ ud             (4) 
emp = 1  if   (z e g g g g1e + be log(wp)+ ue>0)          (5) 
The first equation is the structural equation of the acceptance wage at re-entry (2);  the second is 
the linear projection of the endogenous jobless spell length;   the third equation is the selection 
equation.   The latter yields  the inverse Mill’s ratio.  Thus, the variables log(wp), z, za and ze 
represent the exogenous variables, while log(t) is the endogenous variable.  g g g ga,aa, ba, g g g gd, bd, g g g g1e, 
be are the parameters to be estimated.  
The vector za includes dummies reflecting changes in occupation, sector, and working area, year 
dummies, log unemployment rates and the inverse Mill’s ratio. It does not include attributes of 
new  jobs  as  controls  as  they  may  be  endogenous.  The  variable  emp  is  a  binary  variable 
indicating employment status and the vector ze includes variables for previous job attributes.  
                                                            
10  In  particular,  we  use  the  White  (1980)  heteroskedasticity  consistent  estimator  of  the  variance-
covariance matrix.   12 
We also assume ue distributed as a N(0,1), and orthogonality between the error terms and the 
variables included in the vector za. 
Identification of the structural equations (3) and (4) requires exclusion restrictions, namely at 
least one variable (instrument) correlated with the causal variable of interest,  the spell length 
log(t), but uncorrelated with any other determinants of the dependent variable.  
The reform of the training-at-work contract legislation of 1994 provides valid instruments.   The 
training-at-work contract (Contratto di Formazione Lavoro, CFL) started operating in 1985 to 
enhance youth employment. The program granted employers willing to hire eligible workers a 
substantial labor cost rebate consisting in a 50% reduction of social security contributions and 
automatic  termination  at  the  end  of two  years.      The  program  featured  also  an  off-the  job 
training  component.  At  the  beginning,  eligible  people  were  workers  aged  16-29.  Several 
reforms of the program  took place over the years. The main one, for our purpose, took place in 
1994.  Firstly, the age eligibility rule was extended from 16-29 to 16-32.  Secondly, employers 
were allowed to hire new training-at-work workers during year t, only if at least 60% of the 
CFL workers whose contract terminated in t-1 and t-2 were retained on a permanent basis. Thus, 
the 1994 reform clearly affected the duration of youth unemployment with no impact on post-
jobless wages.  We, therefore,  use two instruments (included in the vector z) : (i) a dummy 
equal to one if individuals are aged 30-32 in the years 1994-1998  (and zero otherwise) to 
capture the extension of the workers eligibility; and, (ii) a dummy activated in years 1994-1998 
to capture the introduction of the restrictive rule on new CFL hires.   Finally, the vector z also 
includes variables referring to previous job attributes (i.e. occupation, type of contract, sector, 
working area, year of separation, employment duration) following the suggestion by Kiefer and 
Neumann (1979) and Hui (1991) according to which past job experiences affect the distribution 
and  arrival  rate  of  job  offers  (and,  thus,  the  jobless  duration).    These  variables  are  not 
statistically  significant  in  explaining  the  post-jobless  wages,  once  other  controls  are  added. 
Therefore we exclude them from  structural equation (3) and use them instead as additional 
identifying  instruments in equation (4).    Tests of instruments validity are presented in the 
Tables  APP_2  and APP_3  (Appendix).      13 
In the above model we do not account for the possible effects of unobserved job match or 
individual  heterogeneity.  Unfortunately,  we  cannot  use  standard  methods  to  control  for 
individual  heterogeneity  without  considering  multiple  spells.  Thus,  we  follow  the  method 
proposed by Topel (1986) and used by many others since.   The idea is simple: pre-displacement 
wages paid to the workers depend on their productivity and their (observable and unobservable) 
characteristics. Thus, conditioning the post-jobless wage equation on pre-displacement wages 
(by constraining the coefficient on the pre-jobless wage to be equal to one), yields control for 
unobservable worker characteristics as education, individual productivity and ability (Bartel and 
Borjas, 1981). 
     
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Smoothed hazard estimates and cumulative re-employment rates by groups 
Figure  1  displays  the  unconditional  smoothed  estimate  of  re-employment  hazard  from  the 
pooled data.  The monthly re-employment hazard estimate increases over the first 9 months and 
then decreases.  This pattern may hide the existence of different groups of individuals: one of 
“quickly re-employed”, with increasing hazard estimate, and the other of “slowly re-employed” 
individuals..   
Table  2  shows  estimates  of  the  cumulative  proportion  of  re-employed  young  males,  with 
breakdowns by groups. Periods out of work in early careers are indeed very long. Although one 
fourth of the unemployed was re-employed after 6 months of joblessness,  40% had yet to find  
a new position  three years after entry in the jobless state.  This share was down to 33% for 
those aged 16-19 on their first job, and reached 51%  for the late starters (over 26).  On the same 
score, not surprisingly,  individuals with a previous relatively long work experience (12-23 
months) were doing better than those with shorter tenure (9-12 months): 33% vs. 48% still 
unemployed. As already pointed out,  these numbers imply  longer unemployment duration than 
reported anywhere else in Western Europe.  
Differences  in  cumulative  re-employment  rates  are  found  between  individuals  working  in 
different geographical areas.  Young workers of  Northern Italy have the highest re-employment   14 
rates:  after  three  years,  72%  have  been  re-hired,  whereas  the  corresponding  rate  for  their 
Southern colleagues is 52%.   This is in line with the literature on  Italy’s regional differences, 
widely documented by many well known contributions.  
The  proportion  of  people  remaining  jobless  is  higher  for  individuals  who  experience  a 
separation during the 1993 recession.
11   Some of the differences conceal composition effects: 
marked differences are observed across job sectors, occupations and working contracts:  after  a 
three-year jobless spell,  only 58% of individuals with permanent contract are  re-employed, 
against  68% of the individuals with training-at-work contracts, and 67%  of the trainees.   Note 
that, as will be discussed shortly,  long unemployment duration does not necessarily imply 
negative duration dependence. 
 
4.2  Transition out of joblessness: logistic hazard regression model estimates 
In this section, we investigate the factors that impact on the speed of transition from joblessness 
to employment.  Fig. 1 shows the baseline hazard function  over the study period (36 months), 
calculated  without  controlling  for  individual  heterogeneity. 
12    Fig.2  displays  the  estimated 
Kaplan-Meier survivor function.     
Table 3  yields the coefficients of a log(time) baseline hazard function   g(t) = (q-1) t;  
the estimates of (q-1)   are presented  for  the  pooled sample and  for  the  sample of workers 
becoming    unemployed  in  period  t  (with t=1989  to  1995),  without taking  into  account  the 
impact  of  unobserved  heterogeneity.  In  table  4,  we  present  estimates    of  the    q1,…  q6  
coefficients of a non-parametric flexible specification (with duration-interval dummies) of the 
alternative baseline function   
    g(t) = q1 * month(1-6) + q2 * month(7-12) + …….q6* month (31-36) + covariates   
                                                            
11  Only few individuals suffered involuntary separation in 1989.  For this reason we  do not  present 
cumulative re-employment rates for displacements occurred in 1989.   
 
12  A similar Kaplan-Meier baseline hazard  is reported in France by A. Terracol (2009):  individuals who 
receive guaranteed minimum income (RMI) are compared with people who do not.  As expected, the 
baseline hazard of the latter slightly dominates the former (i.e. it is a bit lower): after 12 months the 
surviving rate is around 50% (62% in our exploration); after 30 months it is around 42%  (25% in our 
data).          15 
with unobserved heterogeneity accounted for (complete results in tab. 5). While, as expected, 
the  estimates  yield    -q1^  >  -q2^  >  …..>  -q6^,    both  specifications  suggest  that  negative 
unemployment duration dependence is modest compared to what might have been expected 
given the length of unemployment duration (Box A).   The reference group includes individuals 
aged  20-25  years  on  entry,  blue  collar  workers  who  had  permanent  contracts  in  the 
manufacturing sector of the Northwest, and experienced separations in 1989. 
There  are  differences  in  re-employment  probabilities  associated  with  age,  previous  job 
occupation and previous job sectors. The oldest individuals (aged 26 or more)  have lower re-
employment  probabilities  than  the  reference  group.  Individuals  having  training-to-work 
contracts have a higher re-employment probability. Also individuals with a previous occupation 
as  trainees  (“apprendisti”)  have  a  higher  probability  of  exiting  unemployment.  Instead, 
individuals  with  jobs  in  the  service  industry  (except  the  financial  sector)  have  lower 
probabilities to be re-employed than in manufacturing (reference group).  Longer job experience 
leads to higher re-employment probability.  The above results confirm those reported in table 2 
displaying the cumulative re-employment rates.  As expected, the estimated elasticity of the 
hazard estimates with respect to the local unemployment  rate  is  statistically significant  and 
negative  (about    –0.5):    re-employment  is  lower  if  job  availability  is  lower.  Local 
unemployment rates are highly correlated with the working areas, and, thus, we include in the 
regression either the local unemployment rates (model A)  or the area dummies (model B). In 
both  specifications  we  find  almost  identical  results.  In  particular,  individuals  working  in 
Southern Italy or the Islands (both high unemployment areas) have the lowest probability of re-
employment.       
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Table 3. Estimated duration dependence: log(time) baseline hazard function 
 
 
Regression for each  Estimated duration  Unobserved   Covariates 
displacement year:  dependence  heterogeneity    
1989  -0.381*  (0.189)  no  Yes 
1990  -0.532** (0.057)  no  Yes 
1991  -0.713** (0.052)  no  Yes 
1992  -0.543** (0.055)  no  Yes 
1993  -0.440** (0.064)  no  Yes 
1994  -0.439** (0.080)  no  Yes 
1995  -0.498** (0.159)  no  Yes 
Pooling sample  -0.567** (0.026)  no  Yes 




Table 4. Estimated duration dependence: non-parametric baseline hazard function 
 
Pooling sample  Estimated duration  Estimated duration 
  dependence  dependence 
Unobserved heterog  no  yes 
Covariates  yes  yes 
months 1-6  -4.048** (0.840)  -4.189** (0.970) 
months 7-12  -4.583** (0.841)  -4.621** (0.971) 
months 13-18  -4.671** (0.841)  -4.637** (0.970) 
months 19-24  -5.257** (0.844)  -5.171** (0.972) 
months 25-30  -5.229** (0.843)  -5.117** (0.971) 
months 31-36  -5.736** (0.848)  -5.595** (0.976) 




Box A :  how big is negative unemployment dependence ?     
Equation (1) yields  the probability of person i of being re-employed after t months, given that 
he  has  been  jobless  for  t-1  months.      In  order  to  have  orders  of  magnitude  of  negative 
unemployment dependence, we report rough bounds of such probabilities for the benchmark 
individual, calculated from the coefficient estimates of tab. 3 and 4.  For tab. 3 we use a linear  
approximation  of    g(t)    obtained    from  fig.2  and  the  estimated  coefficient  of  duration 
dependence on the pooled sample ; for tab. 4  we make direct use of the (q)-coefficients applied 
to the duration interval dummies. 
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Pr[re-employed after T months| unemployed  
through T-1] 
Tab.    
3 
  Tab. 4  







T = 3.5   (mid-interval 1-6 months)  0.015    0.101  0.23  0.453 
T = 15.5  (mid-interval 13-18 months)    0.010      0.16   
T = 27.5  (mid-interval 25-30 months)  0.006    0.042  0.11  0.237 
Negative unemployment duration dependence 
as shown by the difference of conditional probabilities: 
Pr[re-employed after T months| unemployed til T-1]   - 
Pr[re-employed after V months| unemployed til V-1]  
         
T  = 3.5;     V  =  15.5   0.005      0.07   
T = 3.5;      V =   27.5  0.009    0.06  0.12  0.21 
 
Negative unemployment duration dependence appears very modest.   All estimates  of  
Pr[re-employed after T months| unemployed through T-1], whether obtained from the estimated 
coefficients reported in Tab. 3 or  4,  are small.   For a short unemployment spell like  T =3.5 
the  largest  estimate  of  the  re-employment  probability  does  not  exceed  0.23.    After  a  long 
unemployment spell (V = 27.5 months = over 2 years) the re-employment probability of  0.11 
may seem reasonable.  But  the difference between the two is  0.12,  which is indeed very small 
to claim negative duration dependence.  It means that the probability of re-employment after a 
long unemployment spell (2 years +)  is only twice as large as the same probability after an 
unemployment spell of 3.5 months,  about  12 p.p. higher.   A sizeable negative unemployment 
duration ought to imply a much larger difference between the two.  Even if we stretch Tab. 4, 
adding/subtracting  one standard deviation to the estimated coefficients, the difference of  21 
p.p. between the two conditional re-employment probabilities is still too small to prove the 
existence of strong negative duration dependence.        
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4.3  Simultaneous estimation of post-joblessness acceptance wage and elapsed job duration  
Post-joblessness acceptance wage and elapsed job duration are jointly determined and  
simultaneously  estimated  by  3SLS 
13.    Identification  requires  exclusion  restrictions:  two 
instruments  have  been  identified  in  par.  3.2,  their  interpretation  being  discussed  while 
presenting the results of the equation explaining jobless duration.   Tab. 6  and  7  display the 
complete results.  
Two specifications have been estimated: in specification 1  the coefficient of elapsed 
jobless duration is unconstrained, while in it is constrained to 1 in specification 2  (as in Topel, 
1989).      Both  versions  deliver  very  similar  results,  aside  from  the  constrained  coefficient.     
Consider first the equation that explains post-joblessness acceptance wage (tab. 6): an increase 
in jobless duration of 10% will lower wages on the subsequent job by 0.4% This implies, for 
instance,  that the doubling of jobless spell duration (on average, from 6 to 12 months)  will 
reduce the wage at re-employment by a slight  4%: for the average individual, it means a  wage 
reduction  from  1565  euro  to  1502  euro.    Declining  reservation  wages  /  human  capital 
depreciation/ stigma effects may be associated with longer jobless duration, but the Italian case 
appears to be  different from other cases.   Our estimated wage loss incurred by young males  is 
much  smaller  than  the  10-15%  estimated  on  the  total  working  population  in Unites  States, 
Canada, UK and France (Ruhm, 1991; Addison and Portugal, 1989; Topel, 1990; Jacobson et al, 
1993; Farber, 1993 and 1997; Seninger, 1997; Houle and Van Audenrode, 1995 Gregory and 
Jukes, 1997; Cohen, Lefranc and Saint-Paul, 1997).  It is more, in line with results reported by 
Rosolia and Saint-Paul (1998)  and Kletzer and Fairlie (2003).  A plausible, underlying reason is 
the existence in Italy of an informal wage floor  below which people will not be hired: in fact, 
Social Security and health insurance benefits are granted provided the employee’s pay 
is above a minimum which, in the late Nineties, was equivalent to about 50 eu / day.    
The estimated elasticity of pre-jobless wages (when freely determined) is positive and 
about 3.7%.  Notable findings are the positive effects of changes in working area  (about  +10 
                                                            
13  Post-joblessness acceptance wages have  been separately estimated also by OLS with and without 
selectivity adjustment.   Results and comments on interesting differences with the simultaneous version  
are in Appendix.     19 
%) and occupational change (from 15% to 24%), due to a switch to higher wage areas and 
higher qualification.  Sector changes  have  no significant effects on wages as in US studies,  
showing  minor    wage  losses  for    workers  who  switch  industry.    Also  local  regional 
unemployment rates have no direct statistical significant effects. The estimated coefficient of 
the inverse Mill’s ratio is positive (in the unconstrained version) and significant suggesting that  
currently jobless individuals have greater wage losses than their employed counterparts: a signal 
that  both  the  duration  and  the  selectivity  arguments  are  capturing  the  (modest)  impact  of 
declining reservation wage and human capital depreciation on post-jobless wages. 
Consider now the equation of elapsed jobless duration (tab. 7), whose predicted values 
(expressed in log months) feed into the equation of acceptance wages.  All regressors are strictly 
exogenous,  and  reflect  the  individual  workers’  observables  (previous  earnings,  age  at 
displacement, job and industry characteristics, working area, displacement year).  In addition 
two identifying instruments are included, which directly impact on jobless duration, but not on  
re-employment  wages.
14    Both  reflect  changes  in    labor  legislation:  the  first  is  a  dummy  
activated  when  individuals  are    aged  30-32  and  the  calendar  year  is  1994-1998    (<worker 
eligibility extension 1994>):  it captures  the extension of age eligibility for training-and-work 
(CFL) contracts, relevant for about   3% of the sample  observations.   The  second   dummy 
(<employer  eligibility  criteria  1994>)  is  activated    in    the  calendar  year  is  1994-1998  and  
captures  the  introduction  of  a  new  employers’  eligibility  rule,  restricting  the  utilization  of  
training-and-work contracts, and touching upon 18% of the observations.  The coefficient of the 
second instrument is positive and statistically significant indicating that the introduction of the 
new rule increases the length of unemployment  as  it  restricts  the numbers of training-and-
work contracts offered by firms.  The coefficient of the first dummy has the expected negative 
sign  (although  not  statistically  significant),  suggesting  that  the  age  extension  could  reduce 
unemployment length as a larger number of  young  workers become eligible for  training-and-
work contracts.      
 
                                                            
14   Validity of the instruments has been tested and displayed in  Tab. A_2 and A_3. 
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4.4  Robustness 
We conclude with a robustness test aimed at checking our definition of involuntary 
separations. As explained in par. 2  analysis must exclude individuals who voluntarily separated 
from their jobs.  So far, involuntary separations have been recognized as those of individuals 
who experience a jobless period longer than one month. Here we re-estimate the model using an 
alternative, more stringent definition whereby involuntary separations are  those associated  to 
jobless periods  longer than three months.  The only different result  is a slight increase in the 
impact of  jobless duration on re-entry wages: a 10%  increase in jobless duration will lower 
wages on the next  job by 0.5% . 
15  All the remaining  results are confirmed.   
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we explore the mechanisms that produce stigma, discouragement, and 
human  capital  depreciation  in  the  course  of  joblessness.    In  particular,  we  investigate  the 
existence of negative jobless duration dependence and the impact of jobless spells on future 
wages.   Our findings are, to some extent, surprising and relatively out of line compared to 
analogous explorations in countries other than Itally.  
  First of all, we find strong evidence of very long unemployment duration of the young 
male  labor  force:  in the course of the Nineties  40%  of  the unemployed  had yet to find a job 
36 months after entry in the jobless state.  This share was down to 33% for those aged 16-19 on 
their first job, and reached 51%  for the late starters (over 26).  These numbers imply much 
longer unemployment duration than reported anywhere else in Western Europe.     
In  second  place,  and  despite  our  findings  on  unemployment  duration,  we  find  that 
negative  unemployment  duration  dependence  is  modest.    While  the  probability  of  re-
employment decreases also in Italy  as  the elapsed jobless period becomes longer, such decay is 
small.    
                                                            
15 The estimates of the model are available upon request.   21 
Thirdly, we show that young Italian males experiencing jobless periods in their  early 
careers face slight re-employment wage losses. Such losses do increase with the duration of 
joblessness, but here, once again, they are much lower than reported in Unites States, Canada, 
UK, France and Spain.  Our explanation for the Italian specificity is the existence of a wage 
floor    below  which  people  will    not  be  hired  as  they  would  lose  the  eligibility  to  Social 
Security and health insurance benefits: in the late Nineties the wage floor was set at 
about 50 eu /day.  Such floor is not a legal “minimum wage” as it exists in many other 
countries, but it has similar consequences on all forms of  “regular” dependent work.  
The new  flexible  contracts introduced  by the 1997 legislation (Pacchetto Treu) and 
excluded from this exploration, are not subject to similar provisions.  As explained at 
the outset, their exclusion does not impair the results of analysis, as their impact on 
youth employment became substantial only since the late 1998.         
A  final  note  of  caution:  we  have  restricted  attention  to  young  workers 
characterized by a relatively high attachment to the labor market, reflected by the fact 
that all the sample individuals have had an initial working spell at least 9 months long.  
As pointed out at the beginning of our paper, this might introduce a dose of “optimistic” 
bias in our estimates.  Had we extended the analysis to individuals representing the 
universe  of  young  Italian  males,  in  particular  of  those  who  have  had  short  initial 
working spells, our results would look quite different,  possibly more in line with the 
estimates reported for other countries.
16   This is an important task that we leave for 
future research. 




                                                            
16   Preliminary evidence is reported in a yet unpublished script (B. Contini and E. Grand, 2010).   22 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Number of observations  2318  Previous job sector    
Working area        Industry  42.84 
Northwest  25.33%     Construction  24.81 
Northeast  15.32% 
   wholesale. automotive and  
   repair  17.3 
Centre  20.85%     Entertainment  6.21 
South  26.07%     transportation. communication  2.29 
Islands  12.43%     Finance  0.91 
Displacement year    
   services. research and real  
   estate  5.65 
1989  4.31%  Previous job contract    
1990  19.28%     Permanent  79.26% 
1991  23.47%     training-at-work  20.74% 
1992  21.48%  Previous job occupation    
1993  18.29%     Trainee  31.79% 
1994  10.48%     blue collar  53.15% 
1995  2.67%     white collar  15.06% 
Age at initial period     Previous job experience    
   16-19 years  37.62%     9-12 months  45.90% 
   20-25 years  41.50%     12-23 months  54.10% 
   26 or more years  20.88% 
real monthly wage: mean (std 
dev) 
1318 
(449)   28 
Table 2. Cumulative proportion of re-employed individuals 
                 Months    
   6  12  24  36 
All  0.27  0.4  0.53  0.6 
Working area             
Northwest  0.33  0.45  0.62  0.68 
Northeast  0.4  0.54  0.66  0.72 
Centre  0.24  0.38  0.51  0.57 
South  0.19  0.32  0.44  0.52 
Islands  0.18  0.32  0.45  0.51 
Displacement year            
1990  0.3  0.43  0.6  0.66 
1991  0.31  0.44  0.57  0.6 
1992  0.29  0.4  0.52  0.61 
1993  0.21  0.35  0.49  0.56 
1994  0.25  0.4  0.54  0.65 
1995  0.31  0.5  0.66  0.71 
Age at initial period            
   16-19 years  0.26  0.41  0.59  0.67 
   20-25 years  0.28  4  0.52  0.59 
   26 or more years  0.27  0.37  0.45  0.49 
Previous job sector            
   Industry  0.3  0.44  0.59  0.66 
   Construction  0.22  0.36  0.48  0.54 
   wholesale. automotive and repair  0.26  0.37  0.51  0.57 
   Entertainment  0.28  0.41  0.54  0.58 
   transportation. communication  0.26  0.4  0.47  0.47 
   Finance  0.33  0.48  0.67  0.67 
   services. research and real estate  0.25  0.37  0.47  0.54 
Previous job contract             
   Permanent  0.25  0.38  0.52  0.58 
   training-at-work  0.34  0.46  0.62  0.68 
Previous job occupation            
   Trainee  0.28  0.42  0.59  0.67 
   blue collar  0.26  0.38  0.5  0.56 
   White collar  0.3  0.44  0.55  0.59 
Previous job experience             
   9-12 months  0.22  0.32  0.46  0.52 
   12-23 months  0.31  0.44  0.6  0.67 
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Table 3. Estimated duration dependence: log(time) baseline hazard function 
 
 
Regression for each  Estimated duration  Unobserved   Covariates 
Displacement year:  dependence  heterogeneity    
1989  -0.381*  (0.189)  no  Yes 
1990  -0.532** (0.057)  no  Yes 
1991  -0.713** (0.052)  no  Yes 
1992  -0.543** (0.055)  no  Yes 
1993  -0.440** (0.064)  no  Yes 
1994  -0.439** (0.080)  no  Yes 
1995  -0.498** (0.159)  no  Yes 
Pooling sample  -0.567** (0.026)  no  Yes 




Table 4. Estimated duration dependence: non-parametric baseline hazard function 
 
Pooling sample  Estimated duration  Estimated duration 
  dependence  dependence 
Unobserved heterog  no  yes 
Covariates  yes  yes 
months 1-6  -4.048** (0.840)  -4.189** (0.970) 
months 7-12  -4.583** (0.841)  -4.621** (0.971) 
months 13-18  -4.671** (0.841)  -4.637** (0.970) 
months 19-24  -5.257** (0.844)  -5.171** (0.972) 
months 25-30  -5.229** (0.843)  -5.117** (0.971) 
months 31-36  -5.736** (0.848)  -5.595** (0.976) 
Note: the covariates are the same variables used in table 5   30 
Table 5. Transition from joblessness to employment (non-parametric baseline hazard function) 
 
      Model  A    Model  B   
Variables   Coef.     Std.Err.  Coef.     Std.Err. 
Age in the displacement year is 16-19  -0.170     0.090  -0.172    0.090 
Age in the displacement year is 26 or more  -0.298  **  0.087  -0.307  **  0.087 
Previous job occupation: trainees  0.345  **  0.104  0.350  **  0.104 
Previous job occupation: white collars  0.095    0.104  0.106    0.104 
Previous job contract: training-at-work  0.337  **  0.087  0.348  **  0.087 
Previous job sector: construction  -0.209  *  0.085  -0.204  *  0.085 
Previous job sector: wholesale, automotive, repair  -0.222  *  0.095  -0.211  *  0.095 
Previous job sector: entertainment  -0.083    0.140  -0.051    0.142 
Previous job sector: transportation, communication  -0.173    0.239  -0.164    0.240 
Previous job sector: finance  0.157    0.344  0.145    0.345 
Previous job sector: services, research, real estate  -0.364  *  0.157  -0.361  *  0.158 
Previous job experience: ln(months)  0.495  **  0.115  0.488  **  0.115 
Previous job earnings: log(real monthly wage)  0.002    0.123  -0.001    0.124 
log(regional unemployment rate)  -0.505  **  0.064  ---    --- 
Previous working area: Northeast  ---    ---  0.211  *  0.100 
Previous working area: Centre  ---    ---  -0.331  **  0.096 
Previous working area: South  ---    ---  -0.511  **  0.092 
Previous working area: Islands  ---    ---  -0.530  **  0.118 
Displacement year is: 1990  1.255  **  0.226  1.271  **  0.226 
Displacement year is: 1991  1.147  **  0.226  1.145  **  0.226 
Displacement year is: 1992  1.110  **  0.226  1.097  **  0.226 
Displacement year is: 1993  0.965  **  0.230  0.956  **  0.230 
Displacement year is:1994  1.130  **  0.240  1.090  **  0.240 
Displacement year is: 1995  1.363  **  0.292  1.323  **  0.293 
Baseline hazard function: month 1-6  -4.189  **  0.970  -5.090  **  0.965 
Baseline hazard function: month 7-12  -4.621  **  0.971  -5.526  **  0.966 
Baseline hazard function: month 13-18  -4.637  **  0.970  -5.548  **  0.965 
Baseline hazard function: month 19-24  -5.171  **  0.972  -6.088  **  0.967 
Baseline hazard function: month 25-30  -5.117  **  0.971  -6.038  **  0.966 
Baseline hazard function: month 31-36  -5.595  **  0.976  -6.517  **  0.971 
sigma_u  0.655  **  0.138  0.655     0.139 
Rho  0.115  **  0.024  0.115    0.024 
log-likelihood  -5820.07        -5816.77       
Note: the reference group is composed by blue collars aged 20-25  years old (that suffer involuntary 
separations  in  1989),  working  with  standard  contract  in  manufacture  in  the  Northwest;  **  means 
statistical significant at 1% level; * means statistical significant at 5% level. 
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Table 6. The determinants of post-joblessness wages 
log(acceptance wage)  3SLS  3SLS 
          Specification 1         Specification 2 
   Coef.     Std. Err.  Coef.     Std. Err. 
Elapsed jobless duration: log(months)  -0.039  ***  0.008  -0.042  ***  0.010 
Previous job earnings: log(real monthly wages)  0.371  ***  0.030  1.000    . 
Dummy: change in working area  0.130  ***  0.030  0.096  **  0.038 
Dummy: sector change  -0.007    0.018  -0.027    0.022 
Dummy: occupational change  0.149  ***  0.020  0.241  ***  0.027 
Log (regional unemployment rate)  -0.010    0.019  0.007    0.023 
Lambda  0.167  ***  0.053  0.007    0.060 
Year dummies  yes    yes  yes    Yes 
_cons  4.308  ***  0.217  -0.108    0.351 
R-squared  0.1990        0.1961       
Note:    *** statistical significant at 1% level ; **  at 5% level;  *  at 10% level;  
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Table 7 -.  Elapsed jobless duration:  first step estimation and selection equation 
  
First step estimation 
(specification 1) 







Elapsed jobless duration: 
log(months)  Emp 
   Coef.     S. E.  Coef.     S. E.  Coef.     S. E. 
Previous job earnings: log(real 
monthly wages)  0.079    0.135  0.152    0.135  0.091    0.105 
age in the displacement year  0.054    0.045  0.055    0.045  -0.055  ***  0.010 
Previous job occupation: trainees  0.046    0.123  0.041    0.123  0.084    0.091 
Previous job occupation: white 
collars  -0.327  ***  0.109  -0.317  ***  0.109  0.060    0.090 
Previous job contract: training-at-
work  -0.273    0.217  -0.273    0.217  0.259  ***  0.077 
Previous job sector: construction  0.099    0.162  0.098    0.162  -0.180  **  0.074 
Previous job sector: wholesale, 
automotive, repair  0.25  *  0.14  0.249  *  0.140  -0.145  *  0.082 
Previous job sector: 
entertainment  -0.057    0.129  -0.063    0.129  -0.039    0.120 
Previous job sector: trasportation, 
communication  -0.21    0.246  -0.214    0.246  -0.152    0.189 
Previous job sector: finance  0.195    0.336  0.200    0.337  0.188    0.307 
Previous job sector: services, 
research, real estate  0.273    0.277  0.274    0.278  -0.289  **  0.131 
Previous working area: Northeast  -0.361  **  0.141  -0.362  **  0.141  0.157  *  0.094 
Previous working area: Centre  0.278    0.2  0.281    0.201  -0.243  ***  0.084 
Previous working area: South  0.493  **  0.253  0.499  **  0.253  -0.305  ***  0.080 
Previous working area: Islands  0.534  *  0.314  0.538  *  0.314  -0.379  ***  0.098 
Displacement year: 1990  -1.163    0.852  -1.178    0.853  0.904  ***  0.155 
Displacement year: 1991  -1.193    0.726  -1.208  *  0.726  0.722  ***  0.154 
Displacement year: 1992  -1.084    0.763  -1.096    0.764  0.775  ***  0.154 
Displacement year: 1993  -1.151  *  0.673  -1.163  *  0.674  0.654  ***  0.157 
Displacement year: 1994  -2.117  ***  0.808  -2.136  ***  0.809  0.839  ***  0.171 
Displacement year: 1995  -2.981  ***  0.839  -2.991  ***  0.839  0.855  ***  0.232 
Tenure: log(months)  -0.462    0.275  -0.459  *  0.275  0.336  ***  0.101 
Worker eligibility extension 1994  -0.34    0.245  -0.348    0.245       
Employer eligibility criteria 1994  1.699  ***  0.116  1.704  ***  0.116       
Lambda  -1.645    1.383  -1.687    1.384       
_cons  3.185     1.994  2.678     1.995  -0.696    0.810 
Note:  the  reference  group  is  composed  by  blue  collars  that  suffer  involuntary  separations  in  1989,  working  with 
standard contract in manufacture in the Northwest; *** means statistical significant at 1% level; ** means statistical 
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APPENDIX  1 
OLS estimation of the wage equation 
The Mincerian wage regression is also estimated by ordinary least squares (with and without selectivity 
adjustment).  
Table  A_1 : OLS  estimation of the determinants of post-joblessness wages 
log(acceptance wage)     OLS   OLS + Heckman  
                  
   Coef.     Std. Err.  Coef.     Std. Err. 
Elapsed jobless duration: log(months)  -0.012    0.008  -0.014  *  0.008 
Previous job earnings: log(real monthly wages)  0.383  ***  0.026  0.371  ***  0.027 
Dummy: change in working area  0.139  ***  0.032  0.126  ***  0.032 
Dummy: sector change  0.005    0.019  -0.007    0.019 
Dummy: occupational change  0.135  ***  0.020  0.145  ***  0.020 
Log (regional unemployment rate)  0.019    0.017  -0.014    0.020 
Lambda  no    No  0.157  ***  0.050 
Year dummies  yes    Yes  yes    yes 
_cons  4.303  ***  0.357  4.288  ***  0.353 
R-squared  0.1886        0.1952       
Note:    *** means statistical significant at 1% level ; ** means statistical significant at 5% level; * means statistical 
significant at 10% level;  
 
Not surprisingly, the noticeable difference with the results of simultaneous estimation is the impact 
of elapsed jobless duration: here an increase in jobless duration of 10% is estimated to lower future 
wages by a mere 0.12% (0.14% with selectivity adjustment).  All the other coefficient estimates are 
very similar to those obtained with simultaneous estimation.    
The fact that the 3SLS estimate is larger (in absolute value) than the OLS estimate may appear 
counterintuitive if workers exiting jobless spells later are negatively selected based on ability. The 
explanation  runs  as  follows:    we  know  that  the  number  of  re-entering  workers  who  have 
experienced a very long unemployment spell is relatively small, given that our observation window 
ends in 1998: between ¼ and 1/3 of all the entrants from 1992 onwards will not be observed if the 
unemployment spell exceeds 3 years (table 2). Thus, we have a problem of selection due to end-of-
period truncation.  Let  T  be the threshold (a region, not necessarily a point) beyond which few 
observations are at hand. It is reasonable to assume that the wage reduction as a consequence of 
joblessness will reach a negotiated floor below which few will go (the minimum wage in countries 
other than Italy). The wage schedule as a function of joblessness will therefore be negatively sloped   34 
and  upwards  concave,  becoming  horizontal  approaching  the  floor  (or  kinked  near  T)  .  
Simultaneous estimation of our log-specification, accounting for selectivity, will therefore mainly 
catch the observations placed to the left of T, while the OLS estimate will reflect the full sample 
composition.  This  being  the  case,  the  coefficient  of  the  elapsed  jobless  duration  will  be  more 







APPENDIX  2 
The validity of the two instruments corresponding to policy changes used to identify eqs. (3) and (4) is tested 
by estimating the post-jobless wage equation (specification 1) with their inclusion among the regressors. 
Table APP_2 shows that the null hypothesis stating that both coefficients are zero cannot be rejected.   In 
Table APP_3  a similar test is performed on a more stringent null  hypothesis stating that  all the previous job 
attributes have zero coefficients in the post-jobless acceptance wage.  Here too, the null of all coefficients 
being equal to zero cannot be rejected,  suggesting the validity of such attributes as potential instruments.   
 
  Table  A_2 = Test for validity of instruments (two policy changes)     
Ho:       
1  [log(acceptance wage)] Worker eligibility extension 1994  =  0 
2  [log(acceptance wage)] Employer eligibility criteria 1994   =  0 
            chi2(  2) =    3.30       
           Prob > chi2 =    0.1918       
 
Table  A_3 =  Test for validity of instruments (previous job 
attributes)     
Ho:       
1  [log(acceptance wage)] Worker eligibility extension 1994  =  0 
2  [log(acceptance wage)] Employer eligibility criteria 1994   =  0   35 
3  [log(acceptance wage)] Previous job occupation: trainees  =  0 
4  [log(acceptance wage)] Previous job occupation: white collars  =  0 
5  [log(acceptance wage)] Previous job contract: training-at-work  =  0 
6  [log(acceptance wage)] Previous job sector: construction  =  0 
7  [log(acceptance wage)] Previous job sector: wholesale, automotive, repair  =  0 
8  [log(acceptance wage)] Previous job sector: entertainment  =  0 
9  log(acceptance wage)] Previous job sector: trasportation, communication  =  0 
10  [log(acceptance wage)] Previous job sector: finance  =  0 
11  [log(acceptance wage)] Previous job sector: services, research, real estate  =  0 
12  [log(acceptance wage)] Previous working area: Northeast  =  0 
13  [log(acceptance wage)] Previous working area: Centre  =  0 
14  [log(acceptance wage)] Previous working area: South  =  0 
15  [log(acceptance wage)] Previous working area: Islands  =  0 
16  [log(acceptance wage)] Displacement year: 1990  =  0 
17  [log(acceptance wage)] Displacement year: 1991  =  0 
18  [log(acceptance wage)] Displacement year: 1992  =  0 
19  [log(acceptance wage)] Displacement year: 1993  =  0 
20  [log(acceptance wage)] Displacement year: 1994  =  0 
21  [log(acceptance wage)] Displacement year: 1995  =  0 
22  [log(acceptance wage)] Tenure: log(months)  =  0 
           chi2( 22) =   22.95       
           Prob > chi2 =    0.1923       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 